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THE IMPACT OF CHANGE IN AUCTION FORMAT ON BIDDING BEHAVIOR 




We investigate differences in bidding behavior and participation patterns between 
simultaneous and multi-round auction formats held in the state of Oklahoma.  Theory suggests 
there could be differential bidding effects arising from synergies and the release of relevant 
information across the two formats.  We find no statistically significant difference in either the 
number of bids submitted or the bidding patterns observed relative to the control group of 




When bidding on multiple objects, bidders’ strategic behavior is often underlined by 
informational effects and considerations of synergies.  These factors can have a significant impact 
on the revenue rankings of different auction formats.   
We empirically investigate the impact of a change from a multi-round to a single-round 
simultaneous auction setting on bidding behavior and participation patterns.  Every month, the 
Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) calls sealed-bids from prospective bidders to 
auction off road construction contracts.  Until March 2002, ODOT auctioned off these contracts 
in two separate sessions (semi-sequential) on a single day.  A number of projects were auctioned 
off simultaneously within each session.  After the first session, ODOT revealed all information 
generated, that interested bidders could take into account when submitting bids in the second 
session.  After March 2002, ODOT started holding simultaneous first-price auctions in a single 
session.  Such a change in the auction format can have a significant impact on revenues.  Using 
data from 1997 to 2003, we investigate a number of questions: (1) Is bidding behavior more 
aggressive when some auctions are performed in a sequence or is it better to auction all contracts 
simultaneously?  (2) Are there important informational effects that can induce more competitive 
bids in a sequential auction?  (3) Is the probability of submitting a bid different in simultaneous 
and sequential settings?  Alternatively, is the number of bids on multiple projects affected by a 
change in the auction format? 
  Recent theoretical work on this issue was essentially motivated by the FCC auctions of 
PCS licenses in the 1990's.  One of the primary concerns in these auctions was to allow bidders to 
realize synergies that arise due to the geographical proximity of some licenses.  In the absence of 
synergies, Milgrom and Weber (2000) conjectured that, due to informational effects and the 
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  1linkage principle, sequential auctions will generate more revenues than simultaneous auctions.  
When the potential for synergies is present, simultaneous auctions may produce higher revenues.  
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) showed that, in the independent private value context, bidders bid 
more aggressively in the simultaneous auction format if synergies are present.  Rosenthal and 
Wang (1996) analyzed simultaneous auctions when the objects have common values, and 
observed aggressive bidding behavior among bidders who could realize synergies.
1  
We have found no studies that directly compare seller revenue in sequential and 
simultaneous sealed bid auctions.  The empirical literature has focused on the effect of synergies 
on seller's revenues within a single auction format.  Gandal (1997) examines the competition for 
Israeli Area Cable Television licenses that were awarded in sequential auctions.  He found 
aggressive bidding behavior over time when the licenses were interdependent.  Ausubel et al 
(1997) and Moreton and Spiller (1998) show that, generally, bidders holding adjacent licenses in 
FCC spectrum auctions are willing to bid more aggressively.  De Silva (2005) observed 
aggressive bidding behavior due to the presence of geographic synergies in sequential road 
construction auctions in Oklahoma.  Lunander and Nilsson (2004) experimentally compare 
simultaneous, sequential, and combinatorial first-price sealed-bid auctions and show that, despite 
potential for synergies, revenue comparison between formats produced statistically insignificant 
differences.  Our goal is to provide field evidence of the relative performance of multi-round and 
simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions while controlling for potential synergies.  We find 
that, even though firms bid more aggressively on projects that present cost complementarities if 
undertaken with known existing projects, bidders do not react to information provided during the 




We use data from ODOT and the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) on 
auctions that took place between January 1997 and August 2003.
2  Note that TXDOT had a 
uniform policy of holding two sessions within a month throughout our period of analysis.   This 
unique natural experiment allowed us to compare the effects of changes in policy on firms’ 
bidding behavior in Oklahoma and Texas. 
                                                 
1 Using the second-price, simultaneous ascending-bid auction format, Albano, Germano and Lovo (2001) 
compare revenue performance of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions to three other auction formats: 
sequential auctions, VCG auctions and simultaneous one-shot auctions.  They find that the sequential 
auction format performs poorly relative to the two simultaneous auction formats.  Aggressive bidding 
behavior in simultaneous auctions is due to exploitation of synergies.  
2 The ODOT data were obtained from four reports, namely the project plan holder list, as read bid report, 
low bid report, and award notices which are available on the ODOT website.  TXDOT data were gathered 
from similar reports provided by TXDOT. 
  2Both states provide project information at least 28 days before an auction.  Hence, before 
each project is auctioned off bidders learn the location and the detailed project description, the 
estimated completion time, the engineer’s cost estimates and the plan-holders list (the list of 
contractors who purchased plans). At the conclusion of each auction, the bids submitted by each 
bidder, the winning bidder, and the winning bid are revealed.   
We use data from January 1997 to March 2000 to create variables based on bidder history 
such as capacity utilization, whether the bidder is bidding on a location where he has an ongoing 
project, potential rivals’ toughness, and potential rivals’ capacity commitment.  Data from April 
2000 to August 2003 are used to analyze the empirical models.
3  We are interested in examining 
the bidding behavior of bidders who bid before and after March 2002.  Hence, we only utilize 
data of firms that submit multiple bids between March 2000 and August 2003 to use panel data 
techniques to control for unobserved bidder heterogeneity.  Table 1 provides summary statistics 
for both states.  We have 26,446 plan holders who submit 15,381 multiple bids.  There are a 
slightly higher number of plan holders and number of bidders in both states after March 2002.  
Further, Oklahoma has slightly higher numbers when considering multiple bids by a firm in a 
given month and multiple bids by a firm in the same division in a given month.  Finally, both 
states have similar values for relative bids and winning bids. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
  First, we test how change in auction format affected bidding behavior in Oklahoma 
compared to Texas using a panel-data differences-in-differences (DID) methodology.  We model 
this change by classifying auctions into two time periods.  In the first period, ODOT reveals all 
information generated in first session auctions to second session bidders.  For both states, there 
were at least three and a half hours between the two sessions and firms could submit bids until 15 
minutes before the bid letting.  Our specification of the DID model will allow for differential 
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where the unit of observation is firm i bidding in auction a in time period t.  The dependent 
variable used throughout the analysis is the relative bid.  The independent variables include 
controls for format change, variables on auction characteristics, bidder characteristics, rival 
characteristics and characteristics of business environment.   
The β’s measure the changes in bidding in Texas and Oklahoma across periods.  The 
coefficient on Dt
OK,  β1, measures the average difference in bidding in auctions in Oklahoma 
                                                 
3 Since April 2000 OKDOT and TXDOT release similar information before and after each session.  Before 
April 2000 OKDOT did not release the engineer’s cost estimate.  
  3relative to Texas throughout the period of analysis.  β2, captures the average difference in bidding 
between all auctions held before and after the format change.  β3 measures the difference in 
bidding that occurs in Oklahoma auctions compared to Texas auctions in the period after the 
format change.  Our main interest is in the coefficient β3. For an accurate prediction of the effect 
of the format change in Oklahoma we must control for the other factor that could impact 
Oklahoma auctions held after March 2002 differently than Texas auctions.  
  There are two auction-level variables–the number of bidders and a set of project type 
dummies.  We have identified six different project types: asphalt-related projects, concrete work, 
bridge projects, traffic lights and signals, grading and drainage projects, and erosion control 
projects.    We include two variables that measure the cost heterogeneity of bidders, in addition to 
firm fixed effects: bidder’s capacity utilization rate and bidder’s distance to a project.  Further, we 
include a dummy variable, if a firm is bidding on a division where there is an ongoing project, to 
control for any geographical synergies with existing projects identified by De Silva (2005).  We 
constructed three variables to measure rival characteristics.  First, we utilize past information on 
rivals’ bidding success and construct the average winning percentage of all rival plan holders in 
an auction—rival toughness.  Then we include the rivals’ minimum distance to the project and the 
minimum backlog.
4  Finally, we control for changes in factors other than auction format.  Four 
variables control for the business environment.  The first is the monthly, seasonally unadjusted, 
state-level unemployment rate for Oklahoma and Texas, gathered from the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  Next, we use the three-month average of the real volume of projects, constructed by 
adding the engineering cost estimate across projects up for bid in a month for Oklahoma and 
Texas, respectively, and deflating the current value by the PPI.  Then, we divide it by the average 
of the real volume for each state to calculate the relative real volume and, take the three-month 
moving average of the relative real volume.  Next, we consider the state-specific three-month 
average of the number of building permits collected from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Finally, we use monthly dummies to control for any seasonal variations.
 5   
All DID models are estimated with firm fixed effects and the standard errors reported are 
cluster-robust where the clustering is on firms.  We estimate the models on five distinct samples 
of bids.  One sample includes all bids submitted by multiple bidders.  A second sample estimates 
the model using only bidders who had an interest in multiple projects within a single month and 
could take advantage of synergies by submitting multiple bids.  The third sample considers 
multiple bids submitted in the same division by each firm that could identify stronger synergies. 
This sample will assess the potential impact of synergies with a focus on location.  The last two 
                                                 
4 These variables are similar to variables used by Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 
(2000), De Silva, Jeitschko and Kosmopoulou (2005) and De Silva, Dunne, Kankanagme and 
Kosmopoulou (2005).   
5 Our models are estimated with firm fixed effects to control for bidder heterogeneity.  Some of those 
controls have also been used in De Silva, Dunne, Kankanagme and Kosmopoulou (2005). 
  4samples isolate the behavior of those that bid on multiple projects in both periods of time.  The 
variations in the latter regressions measure how bidding varies in the same controlled group of 
bidders. 
  Table 3 presents coefficients for the base model using different samples to control for 
synergies.  The key parameter of interest is β3 that shows there is no difference in bidding 
between Oklahoma and Texas auctions that can be attributed to the format change. This result 
holds even if there is a possible synergy by undertaking multiple projects in the same division. 
Firms, however, bid more aggressively in divisions where there are ongoing projects. With regard 
to the other variables, we identified the following patterns. More competitors result in lower 
procurement costs.  Bidders with a higher capacity utilization rate tend to bid higher.  The larger 
the distance of a bidder from a project location, the less aggressive is his bidding behavior.  The 
negative value of the average rival winning to plan holder ratio indicates that, as rivals get 
tougher, bids generally decline.  The variables that measure business conditions show weak 
effects.  Only the number of building permits has a statistically significant effect, and that is in 
two of the five specifications.  An increase in the relative number of building permits makes 
bidding less aggressive reflecting the availability of other options.  Further, we estimate these 
models for relative winning bids and find no effect of the format change on winning bids either.  
These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.   
Another way information from an early session can affect the auction process is by 
changing the probability to submit a bid and the number of submitted bids.  To investigate 
whether participation patterns have been affected by ODOT’s auction format change, we first 
estimate a probit model.  In column 1 of table 3, we report the probit model results for bid 
submission.  Column 4 shows the probability of winning conditional upon bidding.  In both cases, 
we find no statistically significant effect in the parameter of interest, β3.  Alternatively, we 
consider the effect of the format change on the number of bids submitted by a bidder in a single 
month.  We estimate a count data model on the number of bidders.  The results of the Poisson 
model presented in column 3 show no statistically significant change in the number of bids 
submitted between Texas and Oklahoma.  Finally, in column 4, we report similar results for the 
number of bids submitted by bidders that could potentially exploit synergistic opportunities 
within a given month.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of format change in ODOT auctions (from 
multi-round to single-round simultaneous auction structure) on bidding behavior.  Using the DID 
approach, we find that the format change has no statistically significant effect on firms’ bidding 
behavior and bidder participation patterns.  
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  6Table 1: Summary Statistics of Oklahoma and Texas Road Construction 
Auctions 









Total number of auctions 
 
758 557  1635  1014 
Number of awarded projects 
 
620 443  1575  972 
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**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.  All regressions include a 
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Table 3: Poisson and Probit Regression Results 
Probit Poisson  Variable 

















































Log of engineering Estimate 
 
     -.210** 
(.093) 
Log of engineering Estimate
2 
 
     .007** 
(.003) 
Number of plan holders 
 
     .078** 
(.003) 
Firm bidding on a division where 
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**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.  All regressions include a 
constant term and 11 monthly dummy variables.  The Poisson models in columns (1) and (2) include 32 
project location dummies.  In columns (3) and (4) five project class dummy variables are included. 
 
  9